Bunching: una revisión
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La progresividad del sistema fiscal descansa en el impuesto sobre la renta de las personas físicas en la mayoría de los países avanzados. Sin embargo, esta estructura genera cambios en el comportamiento de los contribuyentes. La ineficiencia fiscal es medida con el cambio de comportamiento de los individuos; el agrupamiento es una de las últimas maneras de medirla. En la última década las investigaciones sobre agrupamiento han encontrado ciertas tendencias comunes para cualquier contribuyente. Con esta revisión de la literatura, se pretende mostrar las lecciones aprendidas con el fin de incrementar la eficiencia impositiva. Los contribuyentes que optan por agruparse son aquellos con rentas bajas y aquellos cuyas rentas provienen del empleo por cuenta propia. Este conocimiento hace posible delimitar las políticas que puedan hacer los encargados de la política fiscal.
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