Análisis económico de la conducta de los votantes

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Publicado: ago 16, 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20430/ete.v73i290.543
Palabras clave:
paradoja de la participación, ley de Duverger, teorema de Condorcet, maldición del votante decisivo, ignorancia racional

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César Martinelli
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

Resumen

En este artículo hago revista de la bibliografía acerca de la microeconomía política en la participación electoral, el voto estratégico y la información de los votantes, con hincapié en avances recientes. Analizo brevemente además algunas consecuencias de esta bibliografía para la consolidación democrática en la América Latina.

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Cómo citar
Martinelli, C. (2017). Análisis económico de la conducta de los votantes. El Trimestre Económico, 73(290), 211–237. https://doi.org/10.20430/ete.v73i290.543
Número
Vol. 73 Núm. 290 (2006): abril-junio
Sección
Perspectiva Económica

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